Về sự biểu thị - B. Russell

* Tạm dịch:

Về sự biểu thị
Bertrand Russell

Bằng một "ngữ biểu thị" tôi hàm nghĩa một ngữ như bất kỳ một ngữ nào trong số sau: một người, người nào đó, bất kỳ người nào, mỗi người, mọi người, vị vua hiện tại của nước Anh, vị vua hiện tại của nước Pháp, trọng tâm của hệ mặt trời ở thời khắc đầu tiên của thế kỷ XXI, sự quay của trái đất quanh mặt trời, sự quay của mặt trời quanh trái đất. Do vậy một ngữ là duy nhất biểu thị tại hiệu quả dạng thức của nó. Ta có thể phân biệt ba trường hợp: (1) Một ngữ có thể biểu thị, và cả không biểu thị, bất kỳ thứ gì; ví dụ như "ông vua hiện tại của nước Pháp". (2) Một ngữ có thể biểu thị một đối tượng xác định; ví dụ như "ông vua hiện tại của nước Anh" biểu thị một người xác định. (3) Một ngữ có thể biểu thị tối nghĩa; ví dụ như " một người biểu thị không nhiều người, mà là một người tối nghĩa. Sự diễn giải những ngữ như thế là một nội dung khó khăn đáng kể, thực sự, rất khó để thiết lập một lý thuyết mà không dễ mắc vào sự phủ nhận về hình thức. Mọi khó khăn mà tôi quen biết với chúng tụ họp lại, trong chừng mức tôi có thể khám phá, bởi cái lý thuyết mà tôi sắp giải thích.

Chủ đề biểu thị là có tầm quan trọng rất lớn, không chỉ trong luận lý và toán học, mà còn trong lý thuyết nhận thức. Ví dụ, ta biết rằng tâm khối lượng của hệ mặt trời ở một thời khắc nhất định là một điểm xác định, và chúng ta có thể xác nhận một số mệnh đề về nó, nhưng ta không có sự quen biết trực tiếp nào với tâm điểm này, mà chỉ được ta biết qua sự mô tả. Sự khác biệt giữa quen biết và nhận thức chừng là sự khác biệt giữa sự thể ta có sự xuất hiện của chúng, và sự thể ta chỉ đạt đến nhờ vào những ngữ biểu thị. Thường xuyên xảy đến đến rằng ta biết một ngữ nhất định biểu thị tối nghĩa, mặc dù ta không có sự quen biết với những gì nó biểu thị, điều này xảy ra trong trường hợp trên về tâm khối lượng. Trong nhận thức ta có sự quen biết với những đối tượng có đặc tính luận lý trừu tượng nhiều hơn; nhưng ta không nhất thiết có sự quen biết với những đối tượng được biểu thị bằng những ngữ ngôn mà ta quen biết với ngữ nghĩa của nó. Lấy một trường hợp rất quan trọng: dường như không có lý do để tin rằng ta từng quen biết với tâm trí của người khác, thấy rằng những thứ này không được nhận thức trực tiếp; từ đây những gì ta biết về chúng có được qua sự biểu thị. Mọi suy nghĩ phải bắt đầu từ sự quen biết; nhưng có được trong suy nghĩ nhiều sự thể mà ta không quen biết với chúng.

Tiến trình lập luận của tôi sẽ như sau đây. Tôi sẽ bắt đầu bằng việc phát biểu lý thuyết tôi dự định chủ trương; rồi tôi sẽ thảo luận về lý thuyết của Frege và Meinong, chỉ ra tại sao không thứ nào trong chúng thỏa mãn tôi; sau đó tôi sẽ đưa ra những cơ sở ủng hộ cho lý thuyết của tôi và cuối cùng sẽ trình bày sơ lược những hệ quả đến từ lý thuyết.

Lý thuyết của tôi, sơ lược, như sau đây. Tôi lấy ý niệm về biến số làm nền tảng; tôi sử dụng "C(x)" để hàm nghĩa một mệnh đề mà x là một thành phần nằm trong nó, ở đó biến số x thiết yếu và hoàn toàn chưa xác định. Khi đó ta có thể xem xét hai ý niệm "C(x) thì luôn đúng" và "C(x) thì đôi khi đúng". Rồi mọi thứ và không thứ nào và thứ nào đó (mà là những ngữ nguyên sơ nhất của những ngữ biểu thị phải được diễn giải như sau:

C(mọi thứ) hàm nghĩa "C(x) thì luôn đúng";

C(không thứ nào) hàm nghĩa "C(x) thì sai" thì luôn đúng;

C(thứ nào đó) hàm nghĩa "Là sai rằng "C(x) thì sai" thì luôn đúng.

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* Nguyên văn:

On Denoting
Bertrand Russell
1905

By a `denoting phrase' I mean a phrase such as any one of the following: a man, some man, any man, every man, all men, the present King of England, the present King of France, the center of mass of the solar system at the first instant of the twentieth century, the revolution of the earth round the sun, the revolution of the sun round the earth. Thus a phrase is denoting solely in virtue of its form. We may distinguish three cases: (1) A phrase may be denoting, and yet not denote anything; e.g., `the present King of France'. (2) A phrase may denote one definite object; e.g., `the present King of England' denotes a certain man. (3) A phrase may denote ambiguously; e.g. `a man' denotes not many men, but an ambiguous man. The interpretation of such phrases is a matter of considerably difficulty; indeed, it is very hard to frame any theory not susceptible of formal refutation. All the difficulties with which I am acquainted are met, so far as I can discover, by the theory which I am about to explain.

The subject of denoting is of very great importance, not only in logic and mathematics, but also in the theory of knowledge. For example, we know that the center of mass of the solar system at a definite instant is some definite point, and we can affirm a number of propositions about it; but we have no immediate acquaintance with this point, which is only known to us by description. The distinction between acquaintance and knowledge about is the distinction between the things we have presentations of, and the things we only reach by means of denoting phrases. It often happens that we know that a certain phrase denotes unambiguously, although we have no acquaintance with what it denotes; this occurs in the above case of the center of mass. In perception we have acquaintance with objects of perception, and in thought we have acquaintance with objects of a more abstract logical character; but we do not necessarily have acquaintance with the objects denoted by phrases composed of words with whose meanings we are acquainted. To take a very important instance: there seems no reason to believe that we are ever acquainted with other people's minds, seeing that these are not directly perceived; hence what we know about them is obtained through denoting. All thinking has to start from acquaintance; but it succeeds in thinking about many things with which we have no acquaintance.

The course of my argument will be as follows. I shall begin by stating the theory I intend to advocate; I shall then discuss the theories of Frege and Meinong, showing why neither of them satisfies me; then I shall give the grounds in favor of my theory; and finally I shall briefly indicate the philosophical consequences of my theory.

My theory, briefly, is as follows. I take the notion of the variable as fundamental; I use `C(x)' to mean a proposition in which x is a constituent, where x, the variable, is essentially and wholly undetermined. Then we can consider the two notions `C(x) is always true' and `C(x) is sometimes true'. Then everything and nothing and something (which are the most primitive of denoting phrases) are to be interpreted as follows:
C(everything) means `C(x) is always true';
C(nothing) means ` "C(x) is false" is always true';
C(something) means `It is false that "C(x) is false" is always true.'

Here the notion `C(x) is always true' is taken as ultimate and indefinable, and the others are defined by means of it. Everything, nothing, and something are not assumed to have any meaning in isolation, but a meaning is assigned to every proposition in which they occur. This is the principle of the theory of denoting I wish to advocate: that denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves, but that every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning. The difficulties concerning denoting are, I believe, all the result of a wrong analysis of propositions whose verbal expressions contain denoting phrases. The proper analysis, if I am not mistaken, may be further set forth as follows.

Suppose now we wish to interpret the proposition, `I met a man'. If this is true, I met some definite man; but that is not what I affirm. What I affirm is, according to the theory I advocate:

` "I met x, and x is human" is not always false'.

Generally, defining the class of men as the class of objects having the predicate human, we say that:

`C(a man)' means ` "C(x) and x is human" is not always false'.

This leaves `a man', by itself, wholly destitute of meaning, but gives a meaning to every proposition in whose verbal expression `a man' occurs.

Consider next the proposition `all men are mortal'. This proposition is really hypothetical and states that if anything is a man, it is mortal. That is, it states that if x is a man, x is mortal, whatever x may be. Hence, substituting `x is human' for `x is a man', we find:

`All men are mortal' means ` "If x is human, x is mortal" is always true.'

This is what is expressed in symbolic logic by saying that `all men are mortal' means ` "x is human" implies "x is mortal" for all values of x'. More generally, we say:

`C(all men)' means ` "If x is human, then C(x) is true" is always true'.

Similarly

`C(no men)' means ` "If x is human, then C(x) is false" is always true'.
`C(some men)' will mean the same as `C(a man)', and
`C(a man)' means `It is false that "C(x) and x is human" is always false'.
`C(every man)' will mean the same as `C(all men)'.

It remains to interpret phrases containing the. These are by far the most interesting and difficult of denoting phrases. Take as an instance `the father of Charles II was executed'. This asserts that there was an x who was the father of Charles II and was executed. Now the, when it is strictly used, involves uniqueness; we do, it is true, speak of `the son of So-and-so' even when So-and-so has several sons, but it would be more correct to say `a son of So-and-so'. Thus for our purposes we take the as involving uniqueness. Thus when we say `x was the father of Charles II' we not only assert that x had a certain relation to Charles II, but also that nothing else had this relation. The relation in question, without the assumption of uniqueness, and without any denoting phrases, is expressed by `x begat Charles II'. To get an equivalent of `x was the father of Charles II', we must add `If y is other than x, y did not beget Charles II', or, what is equivalent, `If y begat Charles II, y is identical with x'. Hence `x is the father of Charles II' becomes: `x begat Charles II; and "If y begat Charles II, y is identical with x" is always true of y'.

Thus `the father of Charles II was executed' becomes: `It is not always false of x that x begat Charles II and that x was executed and that "if y begat Charles II, y is identical with x" is always true of y'.

This may seem a somewhat incredible interpretation; but I am not at present giving reasons, I am merely stating the theory.

To interpret `C(the father of Charles II)', where C stands for any statement about him, we have only to substitute C(x) for `x was executed' in the above. Observe that, according to the above interpretation, whatever statement C may be, `C(the father of Charles II)' implies:

`It is not always false of x that "if y begat Charles II, y is identical with x" is always true of y',

which is what is expressed in common language by `Charles II had one father and no more'. Consequently if this condition fails, every proposition of the form `C(the father of Charles II)' is false. Thus e.g. every proposition of the form `C(the present King of France)' is false. This is a great advantage to the present theory. I shall show later that it is not contrary to the law of contradiction, as might be at first supposed.

The above gives a reduction of all propositions in which denoting phrases occur to forms in which no such phrases occur. Why it is imperative to effect such a reduction, the subsequent discussion will endeavor to show.

The evidence for the above theory is derived from the difficulties which seem unavoidable if we regard denoting phrases as standing for genuine constituents of the propositions in whose verbal expressions they occur. Of the possible theories which admit such constituents the simplest is that of Meinong. This theory regards any grammatically correct denoting phrase as standing for an object. Thus `the present King of France', `the round square', etc., are supposed to be genuine objects. It is admitted that such objects do not subsist, but nevertheless they are supposed to be objects. This is in itself a difficult view; but the chief objection is that such objects, admittedly, are apt to infringe the law of contradiction. It is contended, for example, that the existent present King of France exists, and also does not exist; that the round square is round, and also not round, etc. But this is intolerable; and if any theory can be found to avoid this result, it is surely to be preferred.

The above breach of the law of contradiction is avoided by Frege's theory. He distinguishes, in a denoting phrase, two elements, which we may call the meaning and the denotation. Thus `the center of mass of the solar system at the beginning of the twentieth century' is highly complex in meaning, but its denotation is a certain point, which is simple. The solar system, the twentieth century, etc., are constituents of the meaning; but the denotation has no constituents at all. One advantage of this distinction is that it shows why it is often worth while to assert identity. If we say `Scott is the author of Waverley,' we assert an identity of denotation with a difference of meaning. I shall, however, not repeat the grounds in favor of this theory, as I have urged its claims elsewhere (loc. cit.), and am now concerned to dispute those claims.

One of the first difficulties that confront us, when we adopt the view that denoting phrases express a meaning and denote a denotation, concerns the cases in which the denotation appears to be absent. If we say `the King of England is bald', that is, it would seem, not a statement about the complex meaning `the King of England', but about the actual man denoted by the meaning. But now consider `the king of France is bald'. By parity of form, this also ought to be about the denotation of the phrase `the King of France'. But this phrase, though it has a meaning provided `the King of England' has a meaning, has certainly no denotation, at least in any obvious sense. Hence one would suppose that `the King of France is bald' ought to be nonsense; but it is not nonsense, since it is plainly false. Or again consider such a proposition as the following: `If u is a class which has only one member, then that one member is a member of u', or as we may state it, `If u is a unit class, the u is a u'. This proposition ought to be always true, since the conclusion is true whenever the hypothesis is true. But `the u' is a denoting phrase, and it is the denotation, not the meaning, that is said to be a u. Now is u is not a unit class, `the u' seems to denote nothing; hence our proposition would seem to become nonsense as soon as u is not a unit class.

Now it is plain that such propositions do not become nonsense merely because their hypotheses are false. The King in The Tempest might say, `If Ferdinand is not drowned, Ferdinand is my only son'.' Now `my only son' is a denoting phrase, which, on the face of it, has a denotation when, and only when, I have exactly one son. But the above statement would nevertheless have remained true if Ferdinand had been in fact drowned. Thus we must either provide a denotation in cases in which it is at first sight absent, or we must abandon the view that denotation is what is concerned in propositions which contain denoting phrases. The latter is the course that I advocate. The former course may be taken, as Meinong, by admitting objects which do not subsist, and denying that they obey the law of contradiction; this, however, is to be avoided if possible. Another way of taking the same course (so far as our present alternative is concerned) is adopted by Frege, who provides by definition some purely conventional denotation for the cases in which otherwise there would be none. Thus `the King of France', is to denote the null-class; `the only son of Mr. So-and-so' (who has a fine family of ten), is to denote the class of all his sons; and so on. But this procedure, though it may not lead to actual logical error, is plainly artificial, and does not give an exact analysis of the matter. Thus if we allow that denoting phrases, in general, have the two sides of meaning and denotation, the cases where there seems to be no denotation cause difficulties both on the assumption that there really is a denotation and on the assumption that there really is none.

A logical theory may be tested by its capacity for dealing with puzzles, and it is a wholesome plan, in thinking about logic, to stock the mind with as many puzzles as possible, since these serve much the same purpose as is served by experiments in physical science. I shall therefore state three puzzles which a theory as to denoting ought to be able to solve; and I shall show later that my theory solves them.

(1) If a is identical with b, whatever is true of the one is true of the other, and either may be substituted for the other in any proposition without altering the truth or falsehood of that proposition. Now George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley; and in fact Scott was the author of Waverley. Hence we may substitute Scott for the author of `Waverley', and thereby prove that George IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott. Yet an interest in the law of identity can hardly be attributed to the first gentleman of Europe.

(2) By the law of the excluded middle, either `A is B' or `A is not B' must be true. Hence either `the present King of France is bald' or `the present King of France is not bald' must be true. Yet if we enumerated the things that are bald, and then the things that are not bald, we should not find the present King of France in either list. Hegelians, who love a synthesis, will probably conclude that he wears a wig.

(3) Consider the proposition `A differs from B'. If this is true, there is a difference between A and B, which fact may be expressed in the form `the difference between A and B subsists'. But if it is false that A differs from B, then there is no difference between A and B, which fact may be expressed in the form `the difference between A and B does not subsist'. But how can a non-entity be the subject of a proposition? `I think, therefore I am' is no more evident than `I am the subject of a proposition, therefore I am'; provided `I am' is taken to assert subsistence or being, not existence. Hence, it would appear, it must always be self-contradictory to deny the being of anything; but we have seen, in connexion with Meinong, that to admit being also sometimes leads to contradictions. Thus if A and B do not differ, to suppose either that there is, or that there is not, such an object as `the difference between A and B' seems equally impossible.

The relation of the meaning to the denotation involves certain rather curious difficulties, which seem in themselves sufficient to prove that the theory which leads to such difficulties must be wrong.

When we wish to speak about the meaning of a denoting phrase, as opposed to its denotation, the natural mode of doing so is by inverted commas. Thus we say:

The center of mass of the solar system is a point, not a denoting complex;
`The center of mass of the solar system' is a denoting complex, not a point.

Or again,

The first line of Gray's Elegy states a proposition.
`The first line of Gray's Elegy' does not state a proposition.

Thus taking any denoting phrase, say C, we wish to consider the relation between C and `C', where the difference of the two is of the kind exemplified in the above two instances.

We say, to begin with, that when C occurs it is the denotation that we are speaking about; but when `C' occurs, it is the meaning. Now the relation of meaning and denotation is not merely linguistic through the phrase: there must be a logical relation involved, which we express by saying that the meaning denotes the denotation. But the difficulty which confronts us is that we cannot succeed in both preserving the connexion of meaning and denotation and preventing them from being one and the same; also that the meaning cannot be got at except by means of denoting phrases. This happens as follows.

The one phrase C was to have both meaning and denotation. But if we speak of `the meaning of C', that gives us the meaning (if any) of the denotation. `The meaning of the first line of Gray's Elegy' is the same as `The meaning of "The curfew tolls the knell of parting day",' and is not the same as `The meaning of "the first line of Gray's Elegy".' Thus in order to get the meaning we want, we must speak not of `the meaning of C', but `the meaning of "C",' which is the same as `C' by itself. Similarly `the denotation of C' does not mean the denotation we want, but means something which, if it denotes at all, denotes what is denoted by the denotation we want. For example, let `C' be `the denoting complex occurring in the second of the above instances'. Then

C = `the first line of Gray's Elegy', and

the denotation of C = The curfew tolls the knell of parting day. But what we meant to have as the denotation was `the first line of Gray's Elegy'. Thus we have failed to get what we wanted.

The difficulty in speaking of the meaning of a denoting complex may be stated thus: The moment we put the complex in a proposition, the proposition is about the denotation; and if we make a proposition in which the subject is `the meaning of C', then the subject is the meaning (if any) of the denotation, which was not intended. This leads us to say that, when we distinguish meaning and denotation, we must be dealing with the meaning: the meaning has denotation and is a complex, and there is not something other than the meaning, which can be called the complex, and be said to have both meaning and denotation. The right phrase, on the view in question, is that some meanings have denotations.

But this only makes our difficulty in speaking of meanings more evident. For suppose that C is our complex; then we are to say that C is the meaning of the complex. Nevertheless, whenever C occurs without inverted commas, what is said is not true of the meaning, but only of the denotation, as when we say: The center of mass of the solar system is a point. Thus to speak of C itself, i.e. to make a proposition about the meaning, our subject must not be C, but something which denotes C. Thus `C', which is what we use when we want to speak of the meaning, must not be the meaning, but must be something which denotes the meaning. And C must not be a constituent of this complex (as it is of `the meaning of C'); for if C occurs in the complex, it will be its denotation, not its meaning, that will occur, and there is no backward road from denotations to meaning, because every object can be denoted by an infinite number of different denoting phrases.

Thus it would seem that `C' and C are different entities, such that `C' denotes C; but this cannot be an explanation, because the relation of `C' toC remains wholly mysterious; and where are we to find the denoting complex `C' which is to denote C? Moreover, when C occurs in a proposition, it is not only the denotation that occurs (as we shall see in the next paragraph); yet, on the view in question, C is only the denotation, the meaning being wholly relegated to `C'. This is an inextricable tangle, and seems to prove that the whole distinction between meaning and denotation has been wrongly conceived.

That the meaning is relevant when a denoting phrase occurs in a proposition is formally proved by the puzzle about the author of Waverley. The proposition `Scott was the author of Waverley' has a property not possessed by `Scott was Scott', namely the property that George Iv wished to know whether it was true. Thus the two are not identical propositions; hence the meaning of `the author of Waverley' must be relevant as well as the denotation, if we adhere to the point of view to which this distinction belongs. Yet, as we have just seen, so long as we adhere to this point of view, we are compelled to hold that only the denotation is relevant. Thus the point of view in question must be abandoned.

It remains to show how all the puzzles we have been considering are solved by the theory explained at the beginning of this article.

According to the view which I advocate, a denoting phrase is essentially part of a sentence, and does not, like most single words, have any significance on its own account. If I say `Scott was a man', that is a statement of the form `x was a man', and it has `Scott' for its subject. But if I say `the author of Waverley was a man', that is not a statement of the form `x was a man', and does not have `the author of Waverley' for its subject. Abbreviating the statement made at the beginning of this article, we may put, in place of `the author of Waverley was a man', the following: `One and only one entity wrote Waverley, and that one was a man'. (this is not so strictly what is meant as what was said earlier; but it is easier to follow.) And speaking generally, suppose we wish to say that the author of Waverley had property phi, what we wish to say is equivalent to `One and only one entity wrote Waverley, and that one had the property phi'.

The explanation of denotation is now as follows. Every proposition in which `the author of Waverley' occurs being explained as above, the proposition `Scott was the author of Waverley' (i.e. `Scott was identical with the author of Waverley') becomes `One and only one entity wrote Waverley, and Scott was identical with that one'; or, reverting to the wholly explicit form: `It is not always false of x that x wrote Waverley, that it is always true of y that if y wrote Waverley y is identical with x, and that Scott is identical with x.' Thus if `C' is a denoting phrase, it may happen that there is one entity x (there cannot be more than one) for which the proposition `x is identical with C' is true, this proposition being interpreted as above. We may then say that the entity x is the denotation of the phrase `C'. Thus Scott is the denotation of `the author of Waverley'. The `C' in inverted commas will be merely the phrase, not anything that can be called the meaning. The phrase per se has no meaning, because in any proposition in which it occurs the proposition, fully expressed, does not contain the phrase, which has been broken up.

The puzzle about George IV's curiosity is now seen to have a very simple solution. The proposition `Scott was the author of Waverley', which was written out in its unabbreviated form in the preceding paragraph, does not contain any constituent `the author of Waverley' for which we could substitute `Scott'. This does not interfere with the truth of inferences resulting from making what is verbally the substitution of `Scott' for `the author of Waverley', so long as `the author of Waverley' has what I call a primary occurrence in the proposition considered. The difference of primary and secondary occurrences of denoting phrases is as follows:

When we say: `George IV wished to know whether so-and-so', or when we say `So-and-so is surprising' or `So-and-so is true', etc., the `so-and-so' must be a proposition. Suppose now that `so-and-so' contains a denoting phrase. We may either eliminate this denoting phrase from the subordinate proposition `so-and-so', or from the whole proposition in which `so-and-so' is a mere constituent. Different propositions result according to which we do. I have heard of a touchy owner of a yacht to whom a guest, on first seeing it, remarked, `I thought your yacht was larger than it is'; and the owner replied, `No, my yacht is not larger than it is'. What the guest meant was, `The size that I thought your yacht was is greater than the size your yacht is'; the meaning attributed to him is, `I thought the size of your yacht was greater than the size of your yacht'. To return to George IV and Waverley, when we say `George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley' we normally mean `George IV wished to know whether one and only one man wrote Waverley and Scott was that man'; but we may also mean: `One and only one man wrote Waverley, and George IV wished to know whether Scott was that man'. In the latter, `the author of Waverley' has a primary occurrence; in the former, a secondary. The latter might be expressed by `George IV wished to know, concerning the man who in fact wrote Waverley, whether he was Scott'. This would be true,. for example, if George IV had seen scott at a distance, and had asked `Is that Scott?'. A secondary occurrence of a denoting phrase may be defined as one in which the phrase occurs in a proposition p which is a mere constituent of the proposition we are considering, and the substitution for the denoting phrase is to be effected in p, and not in the whole proposition concerned. The ambiguity as between primary and secondary occurrences is hard to avoid in language; but it does no harm if we are on our guard against it. In symbolic logic it is of course easily avoided.

The distinction of primary and secondary occurrences also enables us to deal with the question whether the present King of France is bald or not bald, and general with the logical status of denoting phrases that denote nothing. If `C' is a denoting phrase, say `the term having the property F', then

`C has property phi' means `one and only one term has the property F, and that one has the property phi'.

If now the property F belongs to no terms, or to several, it follows that `C has property phi' is false for all values of phi. Thus `the present King of France is not bald' is false if it means

`There is an entity which is now King of France and is not bald',

but is true if it means

`It is false that there is an entity which is now King of France and is bald'.

That is, `the King of France is not bald' is false if the occurrence of `the King of France' is primary, and true if it is secondary. Thus all propositions in which `the King of France' has a primary occurrence are false: the denials of such propositions are true, but in them `the King of France' has a secondary occurrence. Thus we escape the conclusion that the King of France has a wig.

We can now see also how to deny that there is such an object as the difference between A and B in the case when A and B do not differ. If A and B do differ, there is only and only one entity x such that `x is the difference between A and B' is a true proposition; if A and B do not differ, there is no such entity x. Thus according to the meaning of denotation lately explained, `the difference between A and B' has a denotation when A and B differ, but not otherwise. This difference applies to true and false propositions generally. If `a R b' stands for `a has the relation R to b', then when a R b is true, there is such an entity as the relation R between a and b; when a R b is false, there is no such entity. Thus out of any proposition we can make a denoting phrase, which denotes an entity if the proposition is true, but does not denote an entity if the proposition is false. E.g., it is true (at least we will suppose so) that the earth revolves round the sun, and false that the sun revolves round the earth; hence `the revolution of the earth round the sun' denotes an entity, while `the revolution of the sun round the earth' does not denote an entity.

The whole realm of non-entities, such as `the round square', `the even prime other than 2', `Apollo', `Hamlet', etc., can now be satisfactorily dealt with. All these are denoting phrases which do not denote anything. A proposition about Apollo means what we get by substituting what the classical dictionary tells us is meant by Apollo, say `the sun-god'. All propositions in which Apollo occurs are to be interpreted by the above rules for denoting phrases. If `Apollo' has a primary occurrence, the proposition containing the occurrence is false; if the occurrence is secondary, the proposition may be true. So again `the round square is round' means `there is one and only one entity x which is round and square, and that entity is round', which is a false proposition, not, as Meinong maintains, a true one. `The most perfect Being has all perfections; existence is a perfection; therefore the most perfect Being exists' becomes:

`There is one and only one entity x which is most perfect; that one has all perfections; existence is a perfection; therefore that one exists.'

As a proof, this fails for want of a proof of the premiss `there is one and only one entity x which is most perfect'.

Mr. MacColl (Mind, N.S., No. 54, and again No. 55, page 401) regards individuals as of two sorts, real and unreal; hence he defines the null-class as the class consisting of all unreal individuals. This assumes that such phrases as `the present King of France', which do not denote a real individual, do, nevertheless, denote an individual, but an unreal one. This is essentially Meinong's theory, which we have seen reason to reject because it conflicts with the law of contradiction. With our theory of denoting, we are able to hold that there are no unreal individuals; so that the null-class is the class containing no members, not the class containing as members all unreal individuals.

It is important to observe the effect of our theory on the interpretation of definitions which proceed by means of denoting phrases. Most mathematical definitions are of this sort; for example `m-n means the number which, added to n, gives m'. Thus m-n is defined as meaning the same as a certain denoting phrase; but we agreed that denoting phrases have no meaning in isolation. Thus what the definition really ought to be is: `Any proposition containing m-n is to mean the proposition which results from substituting for "m-n" "the number which, added to n, gives m".' The resulting proposition is interpreted according to the rules already given for interpreting propositions whose verbal expression contains a denoting phrase. In the case where m and n are such that there is one and only one number x which, added to n, gives m, there is a number x which can be substituted for m-n in any proposition contain m-n without altering the truth or falsehood of the proposition. But in other cases, all propositions in which `m-n' has a primary occurrence are false.

The usefulness of identity is explained by the above theory. No one outside of a logic-book ever wishes to say `x is x', and yet assertions of identity are often made in such forms as `Scott was the author of Waverley' or `thou are the man'. The meaning of such propositions cannot be stated without the notion of identity, although they are not simply statements that Scott is identical with another term, the author of Waverley, or that thou are identical with another term, the man. The shortest statement of `Scott is the author of Waverley' seems to be `Scott wrote Waverley; and it is always true of y that if y wrote Waverley, y is identical with Scott'. It is in this way that identity enters into `Scott is the author of Waverley'; and it is owing to such uses that identity is worth affirming.

One interesting result of the above theory of denoting is this: when there is an anything with which we do not have immediate acquaintance, but only definition by denoting phrases, then the propositions in which this thing is introduced by means of a denoting phrase do not really contain this thing as a constituent, but contain instead the constituents expressed by the several words of the denoting phrase. Thus in every proposition that we can apprehend (i.e. not only in those whose truth or falsehood we can judge of, but in all that we can think about), all the constituents are really entities with which we have immediate acquaintance. Now such things as matter (in the sense in which matter occurs in physics) and the minds of other people are known to us only by denoting phrases, i.e. we are not acquainted with them, but we know them as what has such and such properties. Hence, although we can form propositional functions C(x) which must hold of such and such a material particle, or of So-and-so's mind, yet we are not acquainted with the propositions which affirm these things that we know must be true, because we cannot apprehend the actual entities concerned. What we know is `So-and-so has a mind which has such and such properties' but we do not know `A has such and such properties', where A is the mind in question. In such a case, we know the properties of a thing without having acquaintance with the thing itself, and without, consequently, knowing any single proposition of which the thing itself is a constituent.

Of the many other consequences of the view I have been advocating, I will say nothing. I will only beg the reader not to make up his mind against the view --- as he might be tempted to do, on account of its apparently excessive complication --- until he has attempted to construct a theory of his own on the subject of denotation. This attempt, I believe, will convince him that, whatever the true theory may be, it cannot have such a simplicity as one might have expected beforehand.

Originally printed in Mind, new series, 14 (1905): 479--493; text from Logic and Knowledge, ed. Robert Marsh, 1956.
Typed 24-25 September 1995 | Typo fixed thanks to A. J. P. Jewell, 1 November 2007

http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/Russell/denoting/ Đọc tiếp →

Hanbooks of Poetry

01.

A Study of Poetry by Bliss Perry:
http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/8221

The Pain and the Pleasure of Words Mutlu Konuk Blasing 227p

Art of the poetry Shira Wolosky 245p

You Can Write Poetry - Jeff Mock 126p

02.

Frances Mayes--The Discovery of Poetry: A Field Guide to Reading and Writing Poems
Steve Kowit--In the Palm of Your Hand: The Poet's Portable Workshop
Ted Kooser -- The Poetry Home Repair Manual: Practical Advice for Beginning Poets
Mary Oliver--A Poetry Handbook
Laurence Perrine--Sound and Sense
Kim Adonnizio and Dorianne Laux--The Poet's Companion: A Guide to the Pleasures of Writing Poetry
Robert Pinsky--The Sounds of Poetry

The Norton Anthology of Modern and Contemporary Poetry, two volumes.
The New Bread Loaf Anthology of Contemporary American Poetry, ed. by Michael Collier and Stanley Plumly,
New British Poetry edited by Don Paterson and Charles Simic,
Contemporary American Poetry, ed. by R. S. Gwynn and April Lindner


03.
Patterns in Poetry

Resources:
Books | Websites
Selected Bibliography

Alexander, Christopher et al., A Pattern Language: Towns, Buildings, Construction. New York: Oxford University Press., 1977.

Bach, Bert C., Sessions, William A., and Walling, William. The Liberating Form: A Handbook-Anthology of English and American Poetry. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1972.

Hass, Robert, ed., The Essential Haiku: Versions of Basho, Buson, & Issa. Hopewell, NJ.: The Ecco Press., 1994.

Hollander, John. Rhyme's Reason: A Guide to English Verse. New Haven Yale University Press, 1989.

Kinzie, Mary. A Poet's Guide to Poetry. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999.

Pinsky, Robert. The Sounds of Poetry: A Brief Guide. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998.

Price, Dorothy, ed., Silent Flowers: A New Collection of Japanese Haiku Poems. Tokyo: Hokuseido Press., 1967.

Stevens, Peter S., Patterns in Nature. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1974.

Strand, Mark and Eavan Boland, eds,. The Making of a Poem: A Norton Anthology of Poetic Forms. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2000.


Websites
Note: For additional online resources, see the links pages for the Sonnet and Haiku learning modules.

Atlantic Unbound Poetry Pages: http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/poetry/poetry.htm
The online version of the Atlantic Monthly. Read the controversial 1991 essay by Dana Gioia called "Can Poetry Matter? The essay argues that poetry has declined as a cultural force in the U.S. because it no longer speaks to a popular audience and has become a domain for an inbred group of academic writers. Atlantic Unbound also features many sound recordings of poems delivered through real audio.

The Academy of American Poets: http://www.poets.org/academy/
Extensive, well-organize site that features a search function, literary articles, an events calendar, audio files and poems in large print. You can search by the name of the poet, poem or first line.

Electronic Poetry Center: http://wings.buffalo.edu/epc/
Maintained by the State University of New York at Buffalo. Great site with lots of links to literary magazines, conferences and festivals. Features many wonderful experimental and hyperlinked poems.

Fooling with Words: The Poets Read: http://www.pbs.org/wnet/foolingwithwords/main_video.html
The Website of Bill Moyer's popular PBS series. This link takes you to video clips where you view poets Mark Doty, Amiri Baraka, Coleman Barks, Sharon Olds and many others reading their works. Includes some interviews.

Glossary of Poetic Terms: http://shoga.wwa.com/%7Ergs/glossary.html
Maintained by prolific if mysterious Dr. Bob. Hundreds of poetic terms defined with hyperlinked cross references and guides to pronunciation; Includes many examples and tips on how to enjoy reading poetry.

The Modern Poetry Association: http://www.poetrymagazine.org/index.html
Publishes Poetry Magazine and the Poets in Person audiocassette series.

RhymeZone: http://rhyme.lycos.com/
Useful search engine that lets you type in a word and retrieve rhymes, synonyms, homophones, words with the same first consonant (grouped by the number of syllables). A great resource if you are attempting to write in a form with a fixed rhyme or syllablic scheme.

Salon Audio: http://www.salon.com/audio/index.html (formerly MP3Lit.com)
Salon Magazine's spoken word site. You can download many of your favorites poets in MP3 format or listen via streaming Real Media. Great resource if you like to listen to poetry being read.

trAce Online Writing Community: http://trace.ntu.ac.uk/
A UK site that attempts to resemble a literary circle. Features include poetry workshops, real-time literary debates, live poets in virtual residence, and writers' journals in hypertext.

UBU Web: http://www.ubu.com/index.html
It's not clear which college maintains this site. But it has an index page with links to the works of hundreds of poets organized into categories such as historical, sound, contemporary, found and insane. Features many experimental works. The interface is a little confusing.

Voice of the Shuttle: Poetry Studies: http://vos.ucsb.edu/shuttle/english2.html#poetry
An extensive list of literary links that include sites devoted to writing, criticism, genres and the workidual poets.

--------------------------------------


Đọc tiếp →

31 songs

http://ebookbrowse.com/nick-hornby-31-songs-pdf-d46953135

1. Teenage Fanclub - "Your Love Is the Place Where I Come From"
2. Bruce Springsteen - "Thunder Road"
3. Nelly Furtado - "I'm Like a Bird"
4. Led Zeppelin - "Heartbreaker"
5. Rufus Wainwright - "One Man Guy"
6. Santana - "Samba Pa Ti"
7. Rod Stewart - "Mama, You Been on My Mind"
8. Bob Dylan - "Can You Please Crawl Out Your Window?" / The Beatles - "Rain"
9. Ani DiFranco - "You Had Time" / Aimee Mann - "I've Had It"
10. Paul Westerberg - "Born for Me"
11. Suicide - "Frankie Teardrop" / Teenage Fanclub - "Ain't That Enough"
12. The J. Geils Band - "First I Look at the Purse"
13. Ben Folds Five - "Smoke"
14. Badly Drawn Boy - "A Minor Incident" (from the About a Boy movie soundtrack)
15. The Bible - "Glorybound"
16. Van Morrison - "Caravan"
17. Butch Hancock and Marce LaCouture - "So I'll Run"
18. Gregory Isaacs - "Puff, the Magic Dragon"
19. Ian Dury and the Blockheads - "Reasons to be Cheerful, Part 3" / Richard and Linda Thompson - "Calvary Cross"
20. Jackson Browne - "Late for the Sky"
21. Mark Mulcahy - "Hey Self-Defeater"
22. The Velvelettes - "Needle in a Haystack"
23. O.V. Wright - "Let's Straighten It Out"
24. Röyksopp - "Röyksopp's Night Out"
25. The Avalanches - "Frontier Psychiatrist" / Soulwax - "No Fun" / "Push It"
26. Patti Smith Group - "Pissing in a River"

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Songbook_%28Nick_Hornby_book%29

Notes: sắp làm dự án 30 cho mình :) Đọc tiếp →

NCĐ I - Chopin, waltz (valse), nocturne, etude, sonata

Chopin, 1810 – 1849, Romanticism.

--------------------------------------------
* Nocturne (Dạ khúc) C minor (Đô thứ) Op.48 no.1:
- Arthur Rubinstein: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h_vZtpjNKVE
Nocturne in F-sharp minor (Pha thăng thứ), Op. 48, No. 2:
- Idil Biret: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RDvgGM8oW8I

* Nocturne in B-flat minor (Si thăng thứ) Op. 9, No. 1
- Arthur Rubinstein: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WnFs85pLmj4
Nocturne in E-flat major (Mi giáng thứ) Op. 9, No. 2- Arthur Rubinstein: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nu48Z45ibxQ
Nocturne in B major (Si trưởng), Op. 9, No. 3- Arthur Rubinstein: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L1w2_2WG5q4

* Nocturne in C-sharp minor (Đô thăng thứ), Op. posth. (tác phẩm xb sau khi qua đời):
- The Pianist soundtrack: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pyiTtv2_WXU

-----------------------------------------
* Waltz (Valse) in D flat major ( Rê giáng trưởng), Op. 64, No. 1 (Minute Waltz)
- Arthur Rubinstein: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tzhOG7ZUeJg
Waltz in C-sharp minor (Đô thăng thứ), Op. 64, No. 2
- Arthur Rubinstein: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TTQbShIfAU8
- Zulkiflimnoer, guitar: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpZQ5t2UNYg

* Waltz in A-flat major (La giáng trưởng), Op. 69, No. 1 (The Farewell Waltz/ Valse de l'adieu):
- Dinu Lipatti: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-DeO3-mvrzw
Waltz in B minor (Si thứ), Op. 69, No. 2:
- Arthur Rubinstein: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VOhr9DH0L3M
- Chet Atkins: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gIF-rXVVN5U

----------------------------------
* Etude (luyện khúc) in E major, Op. 10 No. 3 (Tristesse)
- Maurizio Pollini: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JS7KfOyMEIY
- Paul Palmer guitar: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vEdyQfb8i4A

--------------------------------------------
* Piano Sonata No. 2 in B-flat minor (Si giáng thứ), Op. 35
Marche funèbre for piano written by Frédéric Chopin in 1837, which became the 3rd movement of his Piano Sonata No. 2 in B flat minor, Op. 35
The sonata comprises four movements:
1. Grave - Doppio movimento
2. Scherzo
3. Marche funèbre: Lento
4. Finale: Presto
- Rachmaninoff plays mov. 3 "Funeral March":
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_TbIBqTBM4Q

Notes:

* Nhạc lý/ music theory:
http://truongngocthuy.wordpress.com/2007/11/14/bai-m%E1%BB%9F-d%E1%BA%A7u/
http://www.musicarrangers.com/star-theory/p02.htm
http://music-theory.ascensionsounds.com/category/elements/page/4/* Thuật ngữ:
http://www.8notes.com/glossary/
http://www.classicalworks.com/html/glossary.html
http://www.maikien.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=27&Itemid=40

* Notes/ Nốt nhạc:
A B C D E F G
La, Si, Đô, Rê, Mi, Fa, Sol

* line/dòng kẻ 5, space/khe 4 +2 + ... , tone/tông/giọng, cao độ/pitch (7 nốt chính), trường độ/duration (6 bậc: 1, 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16 1/32), âm sắc/ timbre, cường độ/loudness/intensity,

* scale/gam, clef/khóa, stave/staff/khuông,

* major/ trưởng, minor/ thứ, flat/giáng, sharp/thăng, diatonic/chromatic, chord/ hợp âm, interval/quãng,...* nocturne, serenade, etude, sonata.

* prelude, interlude.

* scherzo (pertaining to the sonata form, a fast movement in triple time), presto (very fast), doppio movimento (double speed), lento (slow), grave, finale.

ct. Đọc tiếp →

Đọc tập thơ Cao Bá Quát

Đọc tập thơ Cao Bá Quát

III.

Thấy vui liền vác tập thơ ra,
Đồ nhắm xưa nay cụ với ta.
Son mực thảy thừa oan kiếp giấy.
Gió mưa lầm lạc rủi đời hoa.
Tấm bia vạn cổ trời đề chữ,
Nắm cốt ba sinh đất gán nhà.
Trên án hương tâm, hồn hỡi dậy.
Sau ly rượu cúc, trước chung trà.

Phan Bội Châu 潘佩珠

(1933)

Nguồn: Thơ văn Phan Bội Châu, NXB Tổng hợp Đồng Nai, TP HCM, 2008.

http://www.thivien.net/viewpoem.php?ID=41285
Đọc tiếp →

Season of the witch

When I looked out my window
Many sights to see
And when I looked in my window
So many different people to be
That is strange, so strange
You got to pick out every stitch
You got to pick out every stitch
You got to pick out every stitch
You got to pick out every stitch
Must be the season of the witch
Must be the season of the witch
Must be the season of the witch
...
Đọc tiếp →

The Beautiful side of somewhere

...
I am lighting matches for the rescue
Some are candles, some are fuses
Acting on my best behavior
Switching over every breaker

As we're plowing through these laws of nature
Disregarding every acre
I'm lying in my Sunday best
Assuming this was not a test, and

I am ready to wake up
There in the exodus
On the beautiful side of somewhere, baby Đọc tiếp →

Nản

Mãn giá cầm thư đồ tự ngu. Đọc tiếp →

Cảm xúc đầu thu kỳ I

初秋感興其一

蕭蕭木落楚江空
無限傷心一夜中
白髮生憎班定遠
玉門關外老秋風

阮攸

Sơ thu cảm hứng kỳ nhất

Tiêu tiêu mộc lạc Sở giang không
Vô hạn thương tâm nhất dạ trung
Bạch phát sinh tăng Ban Định Viễn
Ngọc Môn quan ngoại lão thu phong

Nguyễn Du

Cảm hứng đầu thu kỳ I

Xao xác lá rơi quạnh bến Tương
Lòng đau vô hạn một đêm trường
Ban Siêu tóc bạc đâm buồn ghét
Ải Ngọc gió thu tuổi muộn cùng

Pang De dịch lại. Đọc tiếp →

Dữ Đỗ Mục chi Niệm tích du đệ tam thủ lưu ký

念昔游三首 Niệm tích du tam thủ

年代：唐 Niên đại: Đường
作者：杜牧 Tác giả: Đỗ Mục
体裁：七绝 Thể tài: Thất tuyệt
类别： … Loại biệt: …

十载飘然绳检外，樽前自献自为酬。
秋山春雨闲吟处，倚遍江南寺寺楼。

Thập tái phiêu nhiên thằng kiểm ngoại
Tôn tiền tự hiến tự vi thù.
Thu san xuân vũ nhàn ngâm xứ
Ỷ biến Giang Nam tự tự lâu

云门寺外逢猛雨，林黑山高雨脚长。
曾奉郊宫为近侍，分明㩳㩳羽林枪。

Vân môn tự ngoại phùng mãnh vũ
Lâm hắc san cao vũ cước trường
Tằng phụng giao cung vi cận thị
Phân minh tủng tủng vũ lâm thương

李白题诗水西寺，古木回岩楼阁风。
半醒半醉游三日，红白花开山雨中。

Lý Bạch đề thi Thuỷ Tây tự
Cổ mộc hồi nham lâu các phong
Bán tinh bán tuý du tam nhật
Hồng bạch hoa khai sơn vũ trung

(Chú：thủy tây tự thị chỉ an huy kính huyện tây ngũ lý，hữu nhất tọa thủy tây san，sơn trung hữu thiên cung thủy tây tự。)

㩳: 《唐韻》息拱切《集韻》筍勇切《正韻》息勇切，𠀤音悚。執也，推也。　
又《禮•部韻略》挺也。《杜甫•畫鷹詩》㩳身思狡兔。《註》㩳，猶竦也。　又《集韻》雙講切，雙上聲。亦推也。或省作㨦。
㩳㩳:搠搠
….
(㩳: Tức củng thiết (Đường vận)  đọc là Tủng)


杜牧曾因仕途坎坷，长期飘泊南方。《念昔游》是若干年后追忆那次飘游而写的组诗，一共三首，这是第三首。
　　“水西寺”即天宫水西寺，是宣州泾县水西山中很有名的一座寺院。寺中“凡十四院，其最胜者曰华岩院，横跨两山，廊庑皆阁道，泉流其下”（《江南通志》）。李白曾到此游览，并题有《游水西简郑明府》一诗。此诗杜牧开门见山，提到李白在此题诗一事。李白诗中云：“清湍鸣回溪，绿竹绕飞阁；凉风日潇洒，幽客时憩泊”，描写了山寺佳境。杜牧将这一佳境凝炼为“古木回岩楼阁风”，正抓住了水西寺的特色：横跨两山的建筑，用阁道相连，四周皆是苍翠的古树、绿竹，凌空的楼阁之中，山风习习，风光美妙动人。 　　

李白一生坎坷曲折，长期浪迹江湖，寄情山水。杜牧此时不但与李白的境遇相仿，而且心绪也有些相似。李白身临佳境曰“幽客时憩泊”；杜牧面对胜景曰“半醒半醉游三日”，都是想把政治上失意后的苦闷消释在可以令人忘忧的美景之中。三、四句合起来，可以看到这样的场面：在蒙蒙的雨雾中，山花盛开，红白相间，幽香扑鼻；似醉若醒的诗人，信步走在这一带有浓烈的自然野趣的景色之中，显得非常陶然自得。

杜牧（803－853）唐代诗人。字牧之，京兆万年（今陕西西安）人，宰相杜佑之孙。大和（827-835） 年间登进士第，授宏文馆校书郎。多年在外地任幕僚，后历任监察御史，史馆修撰，膳部、比部、司勋员外郎，黄州、池州、睦州刺史等职，最终官至中书舍人。诗以七言绝句著称，晚唐诸家让渠独步。人谓之小杜，和李商隐合称“小李杜”，以别于李白与杜甫。擅长文赋，其《阿房宫赋》为后世传诵。注重军事，写下了不少军事论文，还曾注释《孙子》。有《樊川文集》二十卷传世，为其外甥裴延翰所编，其中诗四卷。又有宋人补编的《樊川外集》和《樊川别集》各一卷。《全唐诗》收杜牧诗八卷。

http://www.hudong.com/wiki/%E5%BF%B5%E6%98%94%E6%B8%B8%C2%B7%E6%9D%8E%E7%99%BD%E9%A2%98%E8%AF%97%E6%B0%B4%E8%A5%BF%E5%AF%BA


游水西简郑明府
天宫水西寺，云锦照东郭。清湍鸣回溪，绿水绕飞阁。
凉风日潇洒，幽客时憩泊。五月思貂裘，谓言秋霜落。
石萝引古蔓，岸笋开新箨。吟玩空复情，相思尔佳作。
郑公诗人秀，逸韵宏寥廓。何当一来游，惬我雪山诺。
李白

Du thủy tây giản trịnh minh phủ

Thiên cung thủy tây tự，vân cẩm chiếu đông quách。
Thanh thoan minh hồi khê，lục thủy nhiễu phi các。
Lương phong nhật tiêu sái，u khách thời khế bạc。
Ngũ Nguyệt tư điêu cừu，vị ngôn thu sương lạc。
Thạch la dẫn cổ man，ngạn duẩn khai tân thác。
Ngâm ngoạn không phục tình，tương tư nhĩ giai tác。
Trịnh công thi nhân tú，dật vận hoành liêu khuếch。
Hà đương nhất lai du，khiếp ngã tuyết sơn nặc。

Lý Bạch

黄河之水天上来：李白卷――唐宋诗词名家精品类编 书摘：

…
游水西简郑明府①　　天宫水西寺，云锦照东郭。清湍鸣回溪，绿竹绕飞阁。凉风日潇洒，幽客时憩泊②。五月思貂裘，谓言秋霜落。石萝引古蔓，岸笋开新箨。吟玩空复情，相思尔佳作。郑公诗人秀，逸韵宏寥廓③。何当一来游，惬我雪山诺④
[注释]　　①水西：指天宫水西寺，在今安徽泾县之西五里水西山中，寺址尚存。郑明府：或说即溧阳县令郑晏。作者《溧阳濑水贞义女碑铭序》云：“邑宰郑公名晏，家康成之学，世子产之才，琴清心闲，百里大化。”　　②憩泊：犹憩息，休憩止息。　　③“郑公，，二句：谓郑晏善诗，其诗韵逸气宏。按，郑诗今已失传。　　④雪山诺：典出佛教故事。释迦牟尼于雪山修行，称雪山童子，又称雪山大士，终得罗刹半偈，而超越十二劫。见《涅檠经》十四“圣行品”。雪山，指喜玛拉雅山。文殊往化仙人，即其处。[点评]　　诗写水西山景色幽清，气候宜人，夏凉如秋，固约郑明府来游，以论诗文。太白咏水西寺之诗，今存仅此一首，却颇能尽水西风致。杜牧《念昔游》三首其三：“李白题诗水西寺，古木回岩楼阁风。半醒半醉游三日，红白花开烟雨中。”足见此诗在唐朝之影响，是播在人口之作。
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Ba bài thất ngôn bát cú

秋夜記聞

靜院臨清夜
聲聲與耳謀
草間蟲唧唧
雲際雁啾啾
鐘落江城月
砧寒海國秋
鄉關千里客
欲夢并悠悠

Thu dạ ký văn

Tĩnh viện lâm thanh dạ
Thanh thanh dữ nhĩ mưu
Thảo gian trùng tức tức
Vân tế nhạn thu thu
Chung lạc giang thành nguyệt
Châm hàn hải quốc thu
Hương quan thiên lý khách
Dục mộng tịnh du du

Đoàn Huyên (1808-1885)


即事

回首龍城媵劫灰
三朝宮觀暮笳哀
秋風一水兼天去
落日千山繞塞來
橋上聞鵑知地氣
草間射虎惜人才
西湖不記當年事
謾放蓮花照酒杯

阮尚賢

Tức sự

Hồi thủ long thành dắng kiếp hôi
Tam triều cung quán mộ già ai
Thu phong nhất thuỷ kiêm thiên khứ
Lạc nhật thiên sơn nhiễu tái lai
Kiều thượng văn quyên tri địa khí
Thảo gian xạ hổ tích nhân tài
Tây hồ bất ký đương niên sự
Mạn phóng liên hoa chiếu tửu bôi

Nguyễn Thượng Hiền (1868-1926)


槐街歌女

百囀鶯喉巧弄歌
可憐美目貫秋波
蕭疏閭舍持絲竹
琬琰嬌娘強綺羅
輾轉春情愁夜月
悽涼古調咽冥笳
動人最是風流處
一曲南音逸倡和 (1)

段阮俊

Hòe Nhai ca nữ

Bách chuyển oanh hầu xảo lộng ca
Khả lân mỹ tục quán thu ba
Tiêu sơ lư xá trì ty trúc
Uyển diễm kiều nương cưỡng ỷ la
Triển chuyển xuân tình sầu dạ nguyệt
Thê lương cổ điệu yết minh già
Động nhân tối thị phong lưu xứ
Nhất khúc Nam âm dật xướng hòa

Đoàn Nguyễn Tuấn (1751-?) (2)


(1): Bản Hán tự gõ.

(2): Nguyễn Du có bài gửi anh vợ Đoàn Nguyễn Tuấn trong Thanh Hiên thi tập:

和海翁段阮俊「甲寅奉命入富春京登程留別北城諸友」之作

橫山山外嶺南程
琴劍相隨上玉京
兔髓未完新大藥
豹皮仍累舊浮名
滄溟水引杯中綠
故國蟾隨馬後明
此去家兄如見問
窮途白髮正星星

Hoạ Hải ông Đoàn Nguyễn Tuấn "Giáp Dần phụng mệnh nhập Phú Xuân đăng trình lưu biệt bắc thành chư hữu" chi tác

Hoành Sơn sơn ngoại lĩnh nam trình,
Cầm kiếm tương tuỳ thướng ngọc kinh.
Thố tuỷ vị hoàn tân đại dược,
Báo bì nhưng luỵ cựu phù danh.
Thương minh thuỷ dẫn bôi trung lục,
Cố quốc thiềm tuỳ mã hậu minh.
Thử khứ gia huynh như kiến vấn,
Cùng đồ bạch phát chí tinh tinh.

Nguyễn Du

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Updated 15/10/2010:

- Chữ "dắng" 媵 thay bằng chữ "thặng" 賸 (hay 剩). Đọc tiếp →

Bài ca hi vọng

Bài ca hi vọng

Tác giả: Văn Ký
Ca sĩ: Lê Dung

--------------------

* Bonus:

Lên ngàn

Tác giả: Hoàng Việt
Ca sĩ: Ánh Tuyết




* Lê Dung vs. Ánh Tuyết:

Mẹ yêu con
Tác giả: Nguyễn Văn Tí

01. Ca sĩ Lê Dung:




02. Ca sĩ Ánh Tuyết:

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